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I argue that a slight shift in our understanding of the notion of existence is needed in order to
cope with the problem of external world and the problem of mind and body. As a consequence
of it being taught by “givenness” of the subjective mind, and despite its applicability in objective
contexts, it should be considered a “tool” akin to qualia, rather than pertaining to a “true”, objective
reality. In plain language, one’s supposed relation with their surroundings is known to them only in
terms of their private ontology. This conclusion is supported both by intuition and - perhaps most
importantly - by ontological issues in quantum physics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of external world can be very
roughly formulated as follows:
How do I know there is me observing
a world?
The mind-body problem, in turn, as:
Why are there two functionally iso-
morphic sides of my mind [16], the
qualitative one and brain behaviour?
Of course, these are not the only possible for-
mulations; most of all, they are too simple to
highlight the plethora of intriguing aspects of
these issues that arose during centuries of re-
search. Nevertheless, they are enough as regards
the degree of generality I aim for. My intention
here is merely to draw attention to and discuss
a rather broad look at the mind’s subjectivity,
which apparently has not been focused on in the
literature. I would like to leave putting it in a
detailed context within the immensely rich dis-
cipline for the upcoming works, first of all due
to limited space, secondly - in order to make the
reasoning as straightforward as possible by con-
centrating on the main line of thought. An ac-
quainted reader will recognize themes appearing
frequently in the literature, many of them easily
reachable with intuition at the same time, the
originality of which I obviously do not claim.
The most important novel result of this work
is that by introducing an appropriately defined
scope of the notion of existence, relative to a
conscious agent, it is possible to put the issue
of external world in a new light and basically
solve it. As a by-product, one finds the men-
tioned dichotomy inherent in the structure of
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mind fully justified and natural. In order to ar-
rive at these conclusions, I make several common-
sense assumptions:
• qualitative subjectivity (i.e. qualia to-
gether with a point of view) is an empiri-
cal fact (thus, I am inclined to the starting
point of approaches presented for instance
in [1, 2]; in particular, classic papers argu-
ing in favour of this view are [3–7]);
• the subjective mind is functionally isomor-
phic to brain behaviour (a canonical view
in today’s cognitive science [8, 9]; I am very
informal in applying this statement in the
following);
• brain-in-a-vat is possible in principle
(Descartes described the well-known proto-
type in [10], which has been developed later
on, for instance in [11]).
A prelude to the argumentation is an intuition
that we should not be able to reach an exter-
nal world with our thoughts and know we did it,
because it is the role of the mind’s direct con-
tent itself (understood as a “biological signal”) to
provide the link. Contrary to this, we are con-
vinced of being observers, of having external or-
gans which provide sense data, and of knowing
what the external world is. As I show in the fol-
lowing sections, one is able to resolve this issue
by treating seriously a claim that the subjective
mind’s job is to provide the definition of exis-
tence, like it provides a sensation of colour or
sound.
Sections II-IV present a self-contained, consis-
tent reasoning based purely on classical physics.
In section V, I adjust it slightly to the quan-
tum regime and illustrate how well the frame-
work goes with the lack of fundamental ontology
in quantum theory.
2II. THE MAIN ARGUMENTATION
Let us start with an approach which would nat-
urally be advocated for by neuroscience; as we
will quickly recognize, it has to be abandoned
in the end, nevertheless it is a good heuristic
starting point for our discussion. Let us postu-
late an objective reality (described by classical
physics with well-defined, solid ontology), intro-
duce a human in it and let their brain do its work.
One of the most obvious and naive questions one
might ask here is:
Looking from the perspective of a
“god’s eye”, what would the objective
reality be for the brain? (We do not
take the brain’s point of view per se,
just consider it from the outside.)
If the agent was able to react only to mean light
intensity with their perceptive apparatus (other
senses turned off), we could safely claim they had
no idea of a world whatsoever. According to neu-
roscience, in such a situation the agent would
merely be given a signal from their surround-
ings, in the end processed into what might be
loosely called a visual “sensation”, understood at
this point as a state of a collection of neurons.
If the perceptive apparatus, on the other hand,
were a full-blown human one, it would be able to
produce in the observer three-dimensional images
of objects the “god’s eye” saw in front of them.
A routine question specifically in this context is:
Would this mean the observer knew
these objects were there?
The short answer, neglecting basically all of
philosophical dispute surrounding epistemology,
is that they could not, provided the possibility of
brain-in-a-vat was treated seriously. This is be-
cause the two scenarios differ only in the degree
of visual complexity; a three-dimensional visual
scene is still just a signal. Thus, basic neuro-
science and common sense encourage us to as-
sume that the brain actually works in its own
virtual sphere (correlated with its surroundings,
obviously).
This observation makes it easy to arrive at an
intuitively plausible claim, which makes the foun-
dation of the rest of this paper:
Since the brain’s perceptual sphere is
virtual, its content resides in its own
ontology ; put differently, the brain
does not recognize any external on-
tology directly, but has its own, arti-
ficial one, for its own use.
The hidden motivation for making it is, in fact,
having a subjective, qualitative point of view, to-
gether with it being isomorphic with brain be-
haviour: we are intuitively convinced that our
most basic ontology is defined by the subjective
mind (cf. the agent with simple visual conscious-
ness above). There is, however, an important
point which has to be stressed. Intuition requires
us to adopt, based on our own experience, that
such an artificial ontology, encoded in brain be-
haviour, would have to “feel” real for the brain in
some way. To put it in a single sentence, it seems
to be a good guess that the brain should be able
to functionally model existence itself.
Obviously, an intuitive claim is one thing, how
to demonstrate that a behaviour of a collec-
tion of neurons describes an object in an inter-
nal, emergent ontology is a completely different
story. However speculative and hard to imagine
with the present state of neuroscience is seems,
though, I assume it is possible in principle, and
leave formal aspects of these considerations for
future work.
Let us now focus on the following problem:
what does the brain have to say about it ob-
serving a world? Certainly, it sees itself in
some sense. However, since it cannot recog-
nize the external ontology, it cannot see the
true relation between itself and its surroundings.
At most, the brain has an image of itself (call
it “image-brain”) and the surroundings (“image-
surroundings”), formulated in the language of the
mentioned inner ontology. In the end, such an
image-world has to be abstract, described with a
physical theory used by the brain (it is not merely
a visual image; in order to make the terminology
simpler and allow for a hierarchy at the same
time, I understand “inner ontology” as a collective
term for all ontologies used by the brain, more di-
rect, like “sensations”, and more abstract ones).
This implies that the customary, simple picture,
with in fact a single meaningful ontological layer
in which everything happens (in which an artifi-
cial ontology would be “just” a behaviour), is in-
valid from the brain’s point of view. It is because
regardless of the image-world being “more impor-
tant”, for containing more facts than a collection
of direct “sensations”, it cannot be considered on-
tologically fundamental - it is a structure in a
certain sense secondary relative to the simplest
elements of the inner ontology (“sensations”); it
requires some processing of them in imagination
in order to be formed (this regards, obviously,
the brain itself - it can know itself only as such
an image). What is more, despite the true on-
tology being unreachable, there seems to be an
epistemic process, covering the image-brain and
image-surroundings, from the point of view of the
inner ontology. Being troubled by this situation,
the brain would eventually come to the conclu-
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outer world, with the help of its own, private on-
tology. If one took the “god’s eye” perspective,
it would be natural to claim that indeed an ob-
servation was being made, in this or that way,
for there would be the object and its image in
the observer. Solely from the brain’s perspec-
tive, however, there is no observation in the strict
sense, for it has access only to the inner ontology,
containing image-world and an epistemic process
within it ; hence “as if”.
Let us now consider the inner ontology’s “dou-
bling” [17], specifically its simpler part, i.e. the
“sensations”, which follows from what we have
just said. Clearly, there is the inner ontology it-
self, but there is also its image within itself. To
be precise, this configuration can be looked upon
from two angles:
• the external one, if we take the “god’s eye”
point of view and consider specific higher-
level behaviour of the neuronal network on
the one hand (inner ontology), and image
of this higher-level behaviour within itself
(image of the inner ontology), arising be-
cause the brain “sees” itself;
• the internal one, if we take the perspec-
tive of the neuronal network, i.e. choose
the inner ontology as the ontology, and con-
sider “sensations” occurring there (basic el-
ements of the inner ontology), as well as
the notion of image-brain which these “sen-
sations” are able to give rise to (the be-
haviour of which contains an image of the
inner ontology).
In the first case, we might sweep this “doubling”
under the rug, for it is the external ontology
which “really” matters. In the second one, how-
ever, it is not possible: it cannot be neglected
that the “sensations” are ontologically fundamen-
tal, while the image-brain is derived (although
“more important” in the model). The observer
will thus have at their disposal both “sensa-
tions” themselves and their counterparts realized
through behaviour of the image-brain, none on-
tologically reducible to the other.
This is a good moment to include qualitative
subjectivity proper in the discussion. The rea-
soning above is constructed in such a way that it
is easy to turn “sensations” belonging to the inner
ontology into our “given” qualitative data, while
the abstract image-world into our physical world
(i.e. the structure emerging from our physical
theories; still, let us keep it classical). The last
move might be a bit surprising, but - it seems
this is exactly the place where one should pay
attention not to claim the ultimate reality has
been grasped in the ontological sense; I elabo-
rate more on this in the next section. Now, since
we cannot really look at ourselves from outside,
like it was done above, we cannot know what our
brains look like “in reality”; more than that, we
cannot meaningfully think about such a reality at
all, for we are restricted to our inner ontologies.
Thus, if we were to turn observers of the kind
just considered into us, each artificial ontology
would - out of necessity - have to be turned into
a subjectively real one. A consequence is that we
are forced to change the way we think about the
notion of existence in general. We can no longer
treat it as something “imported” from outside the
mind; it has to be defined solely within it (this
is what I meant by abandoning the approach we
started with).
It is already clear that this switch allows us to
solve the problem of qualia, the rotten apple in
the kingdom of science. If we took the external
point of view, they would be merely behaviour of
the true brain (the “sensations”). However, since
one is equipped in an inner ontology, they are
fully allowed to be irreducible “things”.
Now that I have outlined the main line of
thought, I shall turn to justifying the vague
points in the argumentation, as well as discussing
implications thereof.
III. SOME DETAILS
I begin with a point of view, i.e. a single ob-
server. After the fundamental aspects are settled,
the generalization is straightforward.
A. Single agent
First and foremost, there is the issue of the
subjective mind as the source of primary ontol-
ogy. Intuitively, it is easiest and quickest to be-
come convinced about it if one considers a triv-
ial example of qualitative content - a uniform vi-
sual field, which we already mentioned. If I never
happened to reach beyond the particular state of
development corresponding to it, it is intuitively
obvious that I could associate the notion of ex-
istence only with these “walls of colour”; there
would be no notions of a world and observation
for me. It is also immediate to conclude that
this visual field could not be anything belonging
to any “true” [18] ontology, for then its “given-
ness” would have to concern the totality of this
ontology, not merely visual qualia.
This immediately introduces a pressing issue:
how to reconcile the claim that the notion of exis-
tence is subjective with the fact that we are able
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most straightforward way to demonstrate that
the two are able to coexist is to trace the evo-
lution of consciousness from the trivial, uniform
one, to the one we are used to. Let me then, for
ease and clarity, switch to my subjective point of
view and, accepting that the “given” ontology is
fundamental, assume that:
• I know nothing about my or any other
brain;
• as mentioned, my visual field is very simpli-
fied, i.e. I have only “flat”, uniform visual
sensations;
• I have simple thoughts about these sensa-
tions, e.g. I can compare my qualia along a
timeline and I can consider having them (or
rather their “givenness”, since the concept
of “I” is very limited now);
• no other content of my subjective mind is
present.
These assumptions are made in order to erase as
much objectivity as possible, so that the subjec-
tive regime can be conveniently exposed. Now,
if I gradually complicate the structure of my
visual data, two significant transitions may oc-
cur. The first one - when I become able to rec-
ognize three-dimensional objects within my vi-
sual field, the second one - when I notice that
these objects can leave my visual field without
being “destroyed” (in other words, I can follow
their time-development in my imagination when
I do not see them). Both of these extend the
primary notion of existence by pushing it into
imagination to a degree. Obviously, at this point
I cannot have the slightest clue that these ob-
jects represent something - they just arise within
my mind, as a mixture of “sense data” and more
or less clear thoughts. Going on, among spa-
tial objects falling in and out of my visual field
I notice a body with a head. If by any means
I reach my brain (still a three-dimensional vi-
sual object), it is relatively easy to find out that
it has a peculiar relation with the totality of
the field. If something happens to this distin-
guished organ, the field can in principle become
very much distorted. Now, this observation pre-
pares the ground for the construction of what we
describe with physics. The crucial step occurs
when I adopt the view that some things happen
when the mind is “off” (for instance, when I am
asleep or in regions too small to be reached with
my vision) and that it is possible to introduce
a self-contained, total description by postulating
a fundamental ontology (the world), of which -
among others - the visual content of my mind
is merely an image. This amounts to duplicat-
ing, in a certain sense, the brain-surroundings
picture, present so far only in this visual content.
Without going too much into details of how this
happens, it suffices to say that if I make an ab-
straction (described by suitable physical quanti-
ties) of the three-dimensional visual brain I have
in the content of my mind, as well as of its visual
surroundings, impose certain dynamics on them
(the laws of classical physics), and attach the sub-
jective sphere through its isomorphism with this
new abstract brain, the model apparently works
fine. What seems to confirm that I do the right
move in order to uncover the reality is that I can
“suspend” my experience of such a world, or even
erase myself completely from it for some time,
and it will still do its job in the meantime; in
this sense I claim that it is more fundamental
than my mind.
Customarily, thus, we think of the result of
this procedure as reaching a “true” outer world
with abstract thinking. However, it is easy to
convince oneself that the above reasoning could
be repeated, without any changes, in case the
inner-ontology approach (with image-brain and
image-surroundings) was adopted. The simplest,
although heuristic, argument in favour of all our
ontologies being subjective (including the ab-
stract ones) comes from experience. Introspec-
tively, a moment of thought is enough to see that
the notion of existence which helps furnish the
abstract, physical model with particles and fields
is connected with the “givenness” of the qualita-
tive content of the mind; in fact, in can be eas-
ily considered its derivative living in conceptual
imagination. In other words, it is very plausible
that the notion of existence we learn from having
the most direct, subjective content of the mind,
is used in a different area afterwards, with the
help of imagination, memory and so on; switch-
ing then from a purely visual image to the ab-
stract model would not imply that we reached
the “true” world by mere logical reasoning.
If this conclusion is unconvincing, one may re-
fer to the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment: for
a simulation to mimic a mental life properly from
one’s point of view, it has to include the on-
tological level. In order to appreciate this re-
mark, it is enough to imagine such a life from
birth to death - with the workings of a brain-in-
a-vat based solely on sense data (or substitutes
thereof), all understanding achieved by it would
have to be exactly the same as that of its free
twin, provided “sense data” were the same (I as-
sume no other factors can differentiate the two
brains); this naturally concerns also all abstract
models produced by a brain. A short comment
is in order. A true brain-in-a-vat may arise, ob-
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have at our disposal would necessarily have to re-
semble those occurring in an image-world, if we
refer to section II; this is harmless, however, for:
• if we assume “god’s eye”, then the image-
world brain-in-a-vat is implied;
• if we do not, then its possibility is still not
prohibited (if one went in a lab and sub-
jected oneself to a procedure à la brain-in-
a-vat, this procedure would be formulated
in terms of one’s private ontology).
To summarize, the mere fact that we see a
brain and its surroundings (i.e. introduce ex-
terior of what is isomorphic with the subjective
sphere) does not suffice to claim we managed to
grasp the “true” world. In fact, the objective
world each of us introduces from their point of
view is abstract. This immediately suggests that
one is never able to leave the playground of their
own mind - the sense of objective existence seems
to be living within the latter. That is, as for a
world one can have at most an abstract model
equipped in its own ontology (instead of “image-
world” I will call it “quasi-objective world” from
now on; its ontological basis, in turn, as “quasi-
objective ontology”), to which one’s notion of ex-
istence is restricted.
This conclusion needs to be stressed properly.
By the claim that one’s notion of existence is
restricted to one’s mind I mean that the “phe-
nomenon” of existence as we understand and use
it is subjective in a similar sense as qualia; it is
just a “tool”, not “the true existence” (although
it is presented to us as true existence, since we
do not know any other, so to say). One has to
be careful, though, not to fall in the usual trap
of idealism here. The fact that the origin of the
notion of existence is purely subjective does not
mean that one cannot build an abstract objec-
tive world with its help; it only means that this
world does not constitute a common ontological
layer for all minds (see subsection III B), and is
not a “true” world.
The relation between the quasi-objective layer
and our subjective sphere is in fact quite peculiar:
the former is defined in such a way that the latter
is, in a certain sense, dependent on it. This de-
pendence can be considered causal, but causality
acts here on the level of the quasi-objective brain
[19] and its surroundings, not on qualitative sub-
jectivity itself. In other words, we say that the
quasi-objective acts on the subjective because
quasi-objective environment acts on the quasi-
objective brain and there is a one-to-one mind-
quasi-objective-brain isomorphism [20]. We can-
not thus locate qualitative subjectivity in the
quasi-objective world, for this world is an ab-
stract model produced within the mind on the
basis of the mind’s content; it is designed by us
not to contain it. The only problem with intu-
ition here is a false impression that something
built within a mind cannot play the role of some-
thing on which this mind depends. It can, if we
make a separate ontology out of it - living as an
idea, and different from the one containing raw,
live-experienced sensations, and connect the two
properly, through the mind-quasi-objective-brain
isomorphism.
Since I have been using the notion of a “true”
external world, at the same time claiming it was
beyond my reach, its role should be clarified at
some point. In other words, if I cannot have ac-
cess to the “true” ontology, why do I have its idea
at all? I know I have a mind, I also have a brain
interacting with its surroundings, the mind be-
ing represented in the brain as its behaviour - the
first guess is that there indeed is a world in which
I am immersed. But a few persistent problems
urge me to doubt in this picture from time to
time - the possibility of brain-in-a-vat, intuitively
obvious irreducibility of qualia, their subjective
ontological superiority over this objective world,
some ontological problems in quantum physics
(to which we turn later on). Clearly, these issues
go away if I refer to the scenario from section
II. In other words, what I have in my private
ontology, considered fundamental for me, looks
functionally the same as the content of the arti-
ficial ontology from that scenario. Thus, the way
my private ontology works is in a certain sense
implied by some hypothetical [21] “true” ontol-
ogy; obviously, the implication in the opposite
direction is not true, for I cannot discover any
“true” ontology staying inside my mind. Hence,
I have to make the latter metaphysical from my
point of view [22]. This is what I mean by the
phrase “it is as if I was an observer of a «truly»
external world”.
B. Multiple agents
The approach of first inventing a “truly” objec-
tive world, putting an observer in it, then switch-
ing to their subjective sphere and wiping out the
objective one, however heuristic, is useful in set-
tling things when it comes to having more than
a single agent. Besides, it allows to shed some
light on the problem of other minds, formulated
as follows:
Since I can observe only brains of
other conscious agents, what can I
say about the existence of their sub-
jective, qualitative minds?
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II; “«true»” becomes “true” again, until the end of
the paragraph) and look at things from the per-
spective of an external world in which several ob-
servers interact and communicate. Each of them
would have their own inner ontology, formulated
in terms of true brain behaviour; this ontology
would again be composed of a more direct part
(“sensations”), as well as a more abstract one (in
order not to introduce too many terms, let us
call the latter also “quasi-objective”). In particu-
lar, each of them would be describing their own
quasi-objective ontology, all of them being corre-
lated with the external one. Moreover, for each
of these observers only their own inner ontology
would seem to be the real one, all the others be-
ing “just” behaviour of other image-brains, i.e.
artificial ones (for a single true brain there would
now be several image-brains: one for its owner,
the rest in inner ontologies of other agents). Most
importantly, from each point of view communica-
tion would be about the currently chosen quasi-
objective ontology, not about the external world,
or any other, differently defined set of entities.
Now, in order to apply this picture to our situa-
tion, one only needs to jump into a chosen subjec-
tive point of view, i.e. choose an inner ontology,
change its status from artificial to real, and erase
the external ontology.
When this is done, one understands what it
means that ontology as we know it is merely a
“tool” of the mind - one is not able to find qualia
of others, for they are neither in one’s quasi-
objective ontology, nor there is any other ontol-
ogy accessible that could contain them. The only
reasonable way to cope with it seems to be ac-
cepting that existence is just something different
than we thought; we treated it as an outer “phe-
nomenon”, to be learned from outside the mind,
but in fact we only know it as something akin
to the artificial ontology described earlier - we
are agents who bring in their own fundamental
notion of existence each.
On a practical side, I do not need to know other
people’s subjective minds as they are for them,
since I can potentially find “them” as these peo-
ple’s internal ontologies through investigating the
behaviour of their brains (which belongs to my
quasi-objective ontology). In this way I can even
check if a conversation I am conducting with an-
other person is indeed about their ontology, pro-
vided I have enough understanding of their neu-
ronal network. That I do not have access to their
qualia per se as I have to mine is only a harm-
less manifestation of the fact that we do not have
a fundamental ontology which we share between
us.
IV. A BRIEF COMPARISON WITH
EXISTING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS
Let me now contrast the framework I pro-
pose with defining aspects of some traditional
views. To begin with, I would call it both monism
and dualism. Monism, because the foundation
of both private ontologies we naturally claim to
have (qualitative and quasi-objective) is the con-
tent of consciousness. Dualism, for the qualita-
tive ontology is “given” and experienced, while
the quasi-objective one is a heavily abstract con-
struction. The difference from the traditional
monism is that only the source of the two on-
tologies is common, from dualism - that the men-
tal and the physical are not naively “parallel”
(one is either on the qualitative, or on the quasi-
objective side). Going on, the quasi-objective af-
fects the subjective and vice versa, but it is not
the kind of superficial influence known from inter-
actionism. There also is not much to talk about
epiphenomenalism here, since the mental is not
a by-product (epiphenomenon) of the physical.
As for representationalism, we basically started
from its negation - an agent’s consciousness is in
the strict sense considered a closed world with its
own ontologies, so as to allow for brain-in-a-vat,
which we expect to be possible in principle. Re-
garding panpsychism, since each of us treats their
own consciousness as if it were a virtual ontology
developed by perception acting in a world inac-
cessible to us, it does not make much sense to
look for anything “outside” a given mind, specifi-
cally qualitative. Trying to ascribe such qualities
to elements of a chosen quasi-objective ontology
is also unfounded, for qualities are absent by def-
inition in such an ontology.
We might, however, say something construc-
tive, if we consider the physicalism-idealism in-
terface. The approach I propose allows for a
healthy balance between the two apparently op-
posing views. In order to see this, recall that it is
possible to introduce mind-independent entities
not leaving the mind in a sense. Since the mental
and the physical are not exactly parts of a single
ontology, making the physical independent of the
mental does not automatically make the former
literally exist outside the qualitative mind (in a
reductionist view, for instance, where the mind
is reducible to brain behaviour, there necessarily
is a lot more in the global ontology besides - and
thus “outside” - the mind). Instead, we construct
the physical (the quasi-objective ontology) as an
abstract sphere, not containing qualities, define
its behaviour (through equations of physics), im-
merse a quasi-objective brain there (also an ab-
stract structure, obviously) and postulate the
mind-quasi-objective-brain isomorphism. Thus,
7from one’s point of view the quasi-objective sur-
roundings do not “really” exist outside the sub-
jective mind, but outside an abstract brain whose
behaviour is to some degree functionally isomor-
phic to the subjective. All this shows that what
we usually consider as pertaining to the domain
of physicalism can be in a certain - very carefully
defined - sense treated as a “product” of the mind,
leading to an overlap with the traditional domain
of idealism. It is advisable to remember, though,
not to treat the mind-derived quasi-objective on-
tology as absolute or universal, for then one can
easily get an impression as if mind was “steering”
the objective world; this is exactly the kind of
place where the heuristic notion of “true” reality
helps one avoid meaningless conclusions.
When discussing idealism it is not possible not
to mention solipsism. In case I treated ontol-
ogy globally, as a single universal, fundamental
layer, I would indeed be tempted to claim other
subjective minds non-existent. However, now I
should rather say that other subjective minds
do not exist for me, while they exist for their
owners. I am fully entitled to claim that other
agents’ ontologies are not equivalent to mine, be-
cause they, from my point of view, are merely
behaviour of their brains (image-brains, in fact);
thus, these ontologies are less ontological, so to
say. Of course, these other agents say the same
about my subjective ontology. Looking at a dif-
ferent side of solipsism, one can sometimes en-
counter an opinion that “the world as a whole
exists because my mind exists”; here, it is rather
that I understand ontology as a “phenomenon”
only through my mind. Any objective world is
an objective world according to me.
Since I mentioned solipsism - one cannot for-
get philosophical zombies [1] here. Essentially, if
they were conceivable when ontology was global,
it does not make much sense to consider them
now. This is because for me minds of other
agents have the form of image-brain behaviour -
it is meaningless to “turn on and off” their qualia
in my picture. Their qualia exist for them, and
it is completely irrelevant from my point of view
what these qualia are for these agents.
Let us now turn to functionalism, particularly
to the “Chinese nation” argument [12]. Imagine
we ran out of spare neurons, but have a press-
ing need to simulate the behaviour of a human
brain. Since neurons communicate, we might
choose people to play their roles, and since they
communicate quite well and are quite abundant
at the same time, we pick a numerous group
speaking the same language, say the Chinese.
Their total number is not as large as that of neu-
rons in a typical human brain, but is at least of
the same order. Imagine now that they perform
their roles very meticulously and succeed at re-
producing major functions of the brain, together
with the whole apparatus of perception. Imagine
also that one day someone dares to ask this enor-
mous system about its qualia. The answer can
be only one: “I have them.” But for the one who
poses the question the answer seems even more
absurd than in the case of an ordinary brain, for
each constituent of the system is magnified to
a macroscopic size and clearly visible. That is,
however, the essence of the experiment - from
the perspective of the one who asks there is, in
a sense, no point in asking this question, for it
just does not have an answer in terms of experi-
enced qualia on their side. One cannot expect to
be given someone (or something) else’s qualia in
other terms than behaviour of a bunch of neurons
(or pseudo-neurons), because there is no place
for such qualia in an asker’s quasi-objective on-
tology. The only aspect that might be investi-
gated in such a situation is whether higher-level
behaviour of a structure like the Chinese brain in-
deed contains something like the human private
ontology, exhibited in a real brain.
Before we proceed, let us consider one more is-
sue, tightly connected with the subjective sphere.
Some authors (see [2] for instance) point that in
a fully objective approach (i.e. one with a “truly”
outer world in our terminology) it is totally un-
expected that a single mind is somehow ontolog-
ically distinguished over the rest. In short, why
is it my mind that “just exists”, not some other
one? The answer is immediate in the framework I
propose. If the “phenomenon” of existence comes
with the mind, it should be expected to be “on-
tologically distinguished”, for it is distinguished
in its own ontology.
V. QUANTUM CONTEXT
The above discussion could in principle be con-
sidered self-contained. However, there is a very
strong, empirically confirmed support for its con-
clusions from quantum theory, which has been
known for a long time not to possess a well-
defined ontology. Since it is a fundamental the-
ory in reductionistic terms, this lack of ontol-
ogy should propagate to the macroscopic level.
This is, obviously, in huge contrast to what we
see (collectively, it is the problem of quantum-
to-classical transition). For this reason, quan-
tum theory is often claimed to be subjective -
only our most direct experience seems to present
entities in definite states, the outer world being
shrouded in uncertainty and indeterminacy cap-
tured in probability amplitudes. Of course, there
exist well-known attempts to solve these difficul-
8ties; however, they seem to be sweeping this state
of affairs under the rug, mostly by insisting that
an objective ontology should be there.
Quantumness forces a departure from the so-
lution we have discussed so far, albeit not a very
serious one. The obvious reason is that now we
are not able to construct a quasi-objective ontol-
ogy in exactly the same way as above. Specifi-
cally, we are not able to do it bottom-up, for we
would replicate the mentioned issue with onto-
logical reductionism. However, nothing - except
maybe “the spirit of science” - prohibits us from
doing this in the top-down manner, as we actu-
ally do intuitively in real life, by starting with a
description of direct, qualitative content of the
mind, and going to more abstract entities, like
objects living in physical theories. The only re-
striction is that we are not able to reach the bot-
tom, for there any ontological description breaks
down according to quantum theory; instead, we
have to stop at a point where quantum effects
are negligible, i.e. still in the classical regime,
treating the latter as an approximate physical
description, but also as the most distant region
we can reach with a definite quasi-objective on-
tology. Someone familiar with issues from the
quantum-classical border immediately recognizes
here a place for the approach of Bohr and Heisen-
berg, and the famous “cut” [13].
In case one preferred to have a universal physi-
cal theory, i.e. covering the whole scale, the only
solution seems to be pulling all of ontology to
the most direct subjective sphere of the “given”
content of the mind and looking for its connec-
tion with the global quantum state through the
mind-quasi-objective-brain link in order to apply
quantum collapse. In other words, in place of
a quasi-objective ontology there is now its quan-
tum version, which has to be constantly adjusted
(this is where the collapse comes in) to the most
subjective, qualitative sphere, through its link
with the abstract brain. Most of the time along
this repeated adjustment the emerging sequence
of states would allow one to build a classical pic-
ture, due to decoherence effects [23]. This classi-
cal picture would be what we earlier considered
as the quasi-objective.
The process of amplifying indeterminacy in
quantum theory is nicely illustrated with the
measurement problem. It becomes even more in-
teresting if one considers nested measurements,
like in the “Wigner’s friend” thought experiment
[14]. Assume a set-up including a measured
quantum system described with states |si〉 (a
decaying atom is a frequent choice), a measur-
ing apparatus with basis |aj〉 (|a0〉 being the
“ready” state) and a human observer. The pro-
cess amounts to the following two-step evolution










αi|si〉|ai〉 Pj−→ |sj〉|aj〉, (2)
where U is a unitary time-development opera-
tor, while Pj is a projector, returning the post-
collapse state, from which |aj〉 is what the ob-
server sees. Imagine now that we treat this set-
up, together with the observer, as an isolated
quantum system and include another observer in
the picture, who measures it from the outside;
with this move we define the second measure-
ment process. After the first observer performs
the measurement, from their point of view the
state of the inner system - the atom - is per-
fectly definite (in fact, the state of the whole
room’s interior can be idealized as a trivial, one-
element statistical mixture for them). However,
the situation looks quite different from the sec-
ond observer’s point of view - the whole system
inside the room is still in a quantum superposi-
tion, which is known not to be equivalent to an
ordinary statistical mixture. How can it be that
two observers have so radically different descrip-
tions of the same situation? If we view ontology
as universal, this is indeed a problem. However, if
we give each observer their own quasi-objective
ontology (slightly smeared in the second case),
they are never talking about the same collection
of objects; it is true even if they meet, although
then their ontologies are “adjusted” to one an-
other from both points of view, which brings
us back to the situation from subsection III B.
There is thus nothing contradictory in the fact
that the internal observer is involved in a super-
position from the point of view of the external
one. We only need to remember that one always
has to choose a single observer and describe the
situation from their point of view.
The problem of the lack of ontology which
opened this section can be put in a slightly differ-
ent light. One might say that physical quantities
we know and use on the classical level are less
and less well-defined as we go from the macro-
to the micro-level. As an example, if on the
macroscopic level one unambiguously talks about
a point-like localization of a particle at ~x (effec-
tively, of course), on the microscopic one this
turns into “smearing” over a spatial region Ω,
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like a particle’s position is defined, on the other
- such a particle can still be considered point-
like in some sense (take an electron as an exam-
ple). If one performs a position measurement on
an eigenstate of ΠΩ with another projector ΠΩ′
(Ω′ ⊂ Ω), a new “position” emerges, or is pro-
duced by the process of measurement [24]. In
other words, quantum measurement is not epis-
temological - it does not uncover anything. In
this sense, quantum theory does not posses a
fundamental ontology. Now, ill-defined physical
quantities, which could be blamed for a decay
of ontology, might be expected to appear if the
latter was merely a “tool” of the mind. If such
an ontology can be thought of as arising due to
particular signals the “true” brain receives from
“true”, external world, then it is conceivable that
in general only some aspects of the outer ontol-
ogy would be transferred to the inner one, ac-
cording to sensitivity of the “true” perceptive ap-
paratus of the observer. Obviously, it would not
be verifiable for someone on the side of the pri-
vate ontology; quantum measurement would per-
turb their quasi-objective ontology, making the
values of observables appear as created rather
than uncovered, but they would not be able to
find a lower-level mechanism for explaining that.
Nevertheless, such a “possibility” makes quantum
indeterminacy less surprising. In passing, it is
perhaps worth mentioning that not having ac-
cess to a “truly” external ontology from within
the subjective mind sheds new light on another
traditional philosophical issue - the division be-
tween primary and secondary qualities. If things
like position or velocity out if necessity are to be
considered as living in a mind-derived ontology,
they are in no way different than qualia from our
point of view.
We might speculate even a bit more: circum-
stances leading to emergence of properties in the
act of quantum measurement could be blamed
for the probabilistic nature of quantum theory.
If we imagine something beyond our control that
makes our ontology shaky, as with quantum ob-
jects, it is even natural to introduce stochasticity
in its behaviour. Of course, we as agents cannot
confirm that - again, from our perspective it only
looks as if it were so.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
On a daily basis, we are very much accustomed
to thinking that the content of consciousness is
in a direct way a representation of a “true” sur-
rounding world. This makes us convinced that
existence, as a “phenomenon”, is defined outside
consciousness. A seemingly obvious justification
is that each of us is able to construct a theoretical
model of such a world, working regardless of any
observer’s experience. On the other hand, how-
ever, philosophical research along the lines of ide-
alism makes one doubt these claims. The conflict
between these two views is known to have pro-
duced an enormous amount of literature, turning
it into one of the central topics in philosophy. My
modest input here boils down to making use of
an observation that the mere ability to construct
the mentioned model (with a well-defined ontol-
ogy only in classical physics) does not allow one
to claim that the “true” ontology has been cap-
tured; instead, the very notion of ontology has to
be considered as defined subjectively (similarly
as qualia, in a sense), on the basis of the most
direct content of the subjective mind. I have also
shown that considering its origin subjective does
not prohibit one from constructing an abstract
objective world.
Specifically, the approach amounts to employ-
ing perhaps the most obvious, common-sense
(and heuristic) observation possible in the dis-
cussed context: that each of us is necessarily lim-
ited to their “sense data” and processing thereof.
For some reason, we accompany this view with
an assumption of there being one, and only one,
ontological layer possible, covering the surround-
ings, the senses, the brain as well as the latter’s
behaviour. What I propose, instead, is to con-
sider the brain being able to produce an abstract
ontology, in the higher-level dynamics of its neu-
ronal network. The motivation is straightfor-
ward: subjectively we feel we can have a pri-
vate ontology (the “given”, for instance), and this
should be visible in brain behaviour, somehow.
Perhaps the simplest way to reconcile the
seemingly conflicting aspects of the notion of ex-
istence - the subjective and the objective one -
is to treat things as if there was a “true” reality;
to postulate a universal ontology, introduce ob-
servers, postulate their internal artificial ontolo-
gies realized through behaviour of “true” brains,
and finally perform the jump to one of the lat-
ter by making it “real”, while erasing the external
one. Agreed, the approach is heuristic: if I am
in a subjective point of view from the beginning,
how can I possibly have a precise idea of a “true”
reality as it is? Well, I cannot. Nevertheless, a
detailed analysis performed “on the inside” of a
subjective mind makes it harder to remember not
to treat one’s fundamental ontology in an abso-
lute, universal way.
Even if one finds this redefinition of the no-
tion of existence somewhat vague, the positive
consequences of its introduction are encouraging.
It has been claimed from time to time, mostly
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around various “unification” topics in physics,
that a solution is the more valuable, the more
remote problems it can solve at once. Here, re-
search areas involved are indeed distant, and with
a single move all of them are shed new light on.
First of all, subjectivity being ontologically dis-
tinguished becomes natural. Second, it becomes
obvious that qualia cannot be reduced to any-
thing, for they belong to a fundamental ontology.
Moreover, it is pointless to look for them in any
external world from our point of view: the quasi-
objective one is designed not to contain them,
while the “true” one has been effectively wiped
out. Third, brain-in-a-vat stops being problem-
atic. Finally, there is a place for ontological
subjectivity inherent in quantum theory, allow-
ing one to stop looking for de facto metaphysical
ontological models, like Bohmian mechanics and
Many Worlds interpretation.
A better grounding of what has been proposed
in this paper is in the hands of precise introspec-
tion and neuroscience. It appears that the closest
one can get to the subjective from the point of
view of the latter is to recognize it as an agent’s
internal ontology, visible in brain behaviour. On
the one hand, it would be fascinating to see the
kind of neuronal organization this revealed. On
the other, qualia or any other manifestation of
subjectivity are seemingly to stay on the other
side forever due to the resulting adjustment of
the notion of existence.
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